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The literature on trade facilitation has mostly focused on implications for trade volumes. 
However, recent theoretical contributions have emphasized that trade costs –  such as 
transaction costs related to cross-border trade procedures – affect both the traded volumes of 
“old” goods (the intensive margin) and the range of traded goods (the extensive margin). This 
paper therefore tests whether trade facilitation affects the extensive margin by counting the 
number of 8-digit products that are exported from developing to EU countries, and using this 
as the dependent variable in an estimation. Moreover, it also tests  whether  the extensive 
margins in differentiated and homogeneous goods are affected in the same way by transaction 
costs. Estimation results suggest that if export transaction costs – proxied by the number of 
days needed to export a good – declined by 1 per cent, the number of exported differentiated 
and homogeneous products would rise by 0.7 and 0.4 per cent respectively. Policy simulations 
further illustrate that if all countries were as efficient at the border as the most efficient 
country  at the same level of development, the number of exported differentiated and 





JEL Classification: C21, F13, O24 
Keywords:  Trade Facilitation; Extensive Margin;  Export Diversification;  Differentiated 
Products; Homogeneous Products; European Union, Developing Countries. 
                                                      
* The paper – which is a revised version of Working Paper 2008:13, Department of Economics, Lund University, 
with the title “Trade Facilitation and the Extensive and Intensive Margins of Trade” – was partly written while the 
author was visiting the Leverhulme Centre for Research on Globalisation and Economic Policy (GEP) at the 
University of Nottingham. The author thanks Richard Kneller, Inmaculada Martínez-Zarzoso, Patrik Gustavsson 
Tingvall, Fredrik Wilhelmsson, Yves Bourdet, Joakim Gullstrand, Karin Olofsdotter, and seminar participants at 
the Eleventh Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis in Helsinki, June 2008; the Tenth Annual 
European Trade Study Group Conference  in Warsaw, September 2008 and at Lund University for helpful 
comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Marianne and Marcus Wallenberg Foundation, and from 
the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation under research grant numbers P2006-0131:1 and W2009-0352:1 
is gratefully acknowledged. 
†  Address:  Department of Economics, Lund University. P.O. Box 7082, SE-220 07 Lund, Sweden.  E-mail: 
maria.persson@nek.lu.se; Phone: +46 (0)46 222 46 70; Fax: +46 (0)46 222 46 13.    2 
1  Introduction 
While establishing that trade facilitation – the issue of cutting red tape at the border – is one 
of the most interesting and promising current trade policy topics, the existing literature has 
focused almost exclusively on estimating the extent to which reform of trade procedures 
would affect aggregated trade volumes. However, although most scholars agree that trade 
facilitation has a strong potential for increasing trade volumes, little is known about how, i.e. 
through which mechanisms, trade facilitation affects trade. With reference to the growing 
theoretical literature on heterogeneous firm trade theory, does trade facilitation simply 
increase the traded volumes of “old” goods (an effect at the intensive margin) or does it 
increase the range of traded goods (an effect at the extensive margin)? Further, are all 
products similarly affected, or does trade in certain types of products stand to benefit more? 
Answering these questions is arguably important. First, from a policy perspective, it 
is useful to establish whether trade facilitation increases trade primarily through the extensive 
or the intensive margin. If trade grows at the extensive margin, this may be interpreted as 
export diversification, which in turn has been both theoretically and empirically linked with 
economic growth (for an overview of studies and a discussion of the theoretical links, see e.g. 
Herzer and Nowak-Lehmann 2006). Further, the type of good that a country diversifies into is 
not in itself irrelevant: if trade facilitation promotes exports of differentiated products rather 
than homogeneous goods, this would generally be seen as a desirable outcome in terms of the 
development process. 
Additional justification for the importance of studying the effects of trade facilitation 
at the extensive margin, and for allowing different types of goods in the analysis, can be 
found in recent theoretical developments. In an extension to the heterogeneous firm trade 
literature, Chaney (2008) derives a model where the extensive and intensive margins’ 
sensitivities to trade barriers depend on the elasticity of substitution, so the extensive margin 
for differentiated goods is e.g. predicted to be more sensitive to trade barriers than if goods 
were more homogeneous, while the opposite holds for the intensive margin. In other words, in 
order to fully understand how trade will react to changes in trade barriers resulting from trade 
facilitation, it may be necessary to simultaneously take into account both the decomposition 
of trade into its margins and the degree of differentiation of the traded goods. 
At present, the trade facilitation literature contains only limited evidence concerning 
these matters: Dennis and Shepherd (2007) show that export costs at the border have an effect 
on the number of goods being exported, and Sadikov (2007), as well as Martínez-Zarzoso and 
Márquez-Ramos (2008), find evidence that trade facilitation has a stronger impact on the 
traded volumes of differentiated goods. Hence, the two issues have been examined separately. 
However, as illustrated by the theoretical model in Chaney (2008), to get a good picture of   3 
how trade policy changes would affect total trade, it is probably necessary to both decompose 
trade into extensive and intensive margins and allow various types of products in the analysis. 
Focusing on the potential of trade facilitation for North-South trade, this paper 
therefore asks whether the extensive margins of trade in differentiated and homogeneous 
goods are affected in the same way by trade transaction costs related to cumbersome cross-
border trade procedures. This is done by counting the number of 8-digit products that are 
exported from developing to EU countries, and then using this number as the dependent 
variable in an estimation, allowing separate effects for differentiated and homogeneous goods. 
Trade transaction costs are proxied by the number of days needed to export a good, using data 
from the World Bank Doing Business Database.  
Our empirical findings suggest that countries with large export transaction costs, all 
else equal, will tend to export fewer goods. The results further indicate that both the number 
of exported differentiated and the number of exported homogeneous goods are significantly 
negatively affected by inefficient cross-border trade procedures, but also that the negative 
effect is stronger for differentiated goods. These results are consistent with the theoretical 
predictions from Chaney (2008).  
The remainder of the paper starts with an outline of a suitable theoretical framework 
for analyzing the mechanisms through which trade facilitation affects trade. The issue of trade 
facilitation is then discussed, including how to define and measure it. Thereafter, there is an 
empirical section, outlining the empirical strategy and presenting estimation results and policy 
simulations. The last section of the paper summarizes the main results and offers some 
concluding remarks. 
2  Theoretical Framework 
A natural theoretical setting  for linking inefficient cross-border trade procedures to the 
extensive margin of trade is the emerging literature on heterogeneous firm trade theory, with 
Melitz (2003) being a seminal contribution. We focus on one interesting extension to this 
model, Chaney (2008), which allows for many asymmetric countries separated by asymmetric 
trade barriers. Basically, it is a model of monopolistic competition, but unlike representative 
firm models such as Krugman (1980), firms are not identical, but differ in the level of 
productivity, and, in addition, there is a fixed cost of entering the export market. 
Referring to Chaney (2008) for a more detailed description, the intuition behind the 
model is that firms vary by productivity, and because of the existence of fixed and variable 
costs of exporting, only more productive firms will find it profitable  to export. The 
profitability of exports varies according to destination, so it is more profitable to export to 
markets with, for example, high demand, low variable trade costs and low fixed costs. For   4 
every export destination i, there is a threshold level of productivity that yields zero profits 
from exports for firms in country j. All firms in j with a higher productivity than this will have 
positive profits from exporting  to  i.  Therefore, only a subset of domestic firms will be 
exporters, but this subset varies with the characteristics of the foreign market.  
Defining the intensive margin as exports per existing exporter and the extensive 
margin as the set of exporting firms, a reduction in variable  trade costs will affect both 
margins positively, by making each existing exporter export more and increasing the number 
of exporters, since the threshold productivity level will drop. On the other hand, a reduction in 
fixed trade costs will not affect the intensive margin (the existing exporters have already paid 
this cost), but will induce new firms to enter the export market. In other words, it will have a 
positive effect on the extensive margin.  
Chaney (2008) shows  in his model that the extensive and intensive margins’ 
sensitivity to trade barriers is affected in opposite directions by the elasticity of substitution. A 
high elasticity of substitution (homogeneous goods) implies that the intensive margin is fairly 
sensitive to changes in trade barriers, while the extensive margin is not. As goods become 
more differentiated (i.e. as the elasticity of substitution decreases), the extensive margin will 
become more sensitive to trade barriers, whereas the intensive margin will become less 
sensitive. Thus, a theoretical prediction would be that the effects of trade transaction costs on 
the extensive margin will be larger in absolute terms for differentiated goods than for 
homogeneous goods.  
3  Trade Facilitation 
3.1  Background 
Loosely speaking, trade facilitation is about making it easier for traders to move goods across 
borders by making cumbersome cross-border trade procedures more efficient. The Doha 
Ministerial Declaration (WTO 2001), for instance,  formally  refers to trade facilitation as 
“expediting the movement, release and clearance of goods, including goods in transit”. 
Inefficient trade procedures constitute costs to traders in several ways, and it may be helpful 
to think of these costs in terms of being sunk, fixed or variable. Before being able to enter any 
export market, a potential trader must acquire knowledge about the necessary trade 
procedures. The more complex these are, the higher the cost for the trader. A firm only has to 
pay this cost once (unless procedures change), so this may be seen as a one-time sunk cost of 
entering the market. However, each time that goods are to be sent across the border, all the 
relevant procedures must be complied with, so even though the firm has paid the sunk market 
entry cost and knows what to do, it still has to take the time and effort to fill out all relevant 
forms, collect the required stamps etc. The magnitude of these compliance costs will   5 
generally not depend on the volume of the shipment, so they may be characterized as fixed, 
but they will have to be paid each time goods are shipped. Obviously, the more complicated 
and extensive the rules, the higher the costs of complying with them.  
Besides sunk and fixed costs, there may also be variable costs, i.e. costs that depend 
on the size of the shipment. Such costs are for instance caused by the time delays that 
inefficient procedures almost inevitably yield. Time delays lead to (particularly – but not only 
– variable) costs in various ways. Depending on the type of good, there may be depreciation 
costs – either in terms of physical depreciation or because products quickly lose their market 
value. Further, long delays will cause unnecessary storage costs, they are associated with 
increased uncertainty about delivery times, and they may simply leave companies unable to 
take advantage of business opportunities.  
How can such costs be lowered? Concretely, trade facilitation might include reforms 
such as reducing the number of official documents, signatures and stamps required for 
exports; standardizing and simplifying required documentation; increasing the possibilities for 
electronic data submission; publishing all relevant laws, regulations etc. about trade 
procedures and data requirements; creating a website where all relevant information can be 
found; implementing audit-based control and risk management and improving the 
communication between relevant government bodies (see e.g. Hellqvist 2003, Swedish 
National Board of Trade 2008 or Milner et al. 2008). 
3.2   Previous Research 
So far, the research that has been done to assess the trade effects of trade facilitation has 
focused on the implications for aggregated trade volumes. All in the gravity tradition, but 
using various ways to define and measure trade facilitation and to estimate its results, Wilson 
et al. (2003; 2005), Soloaga et al. (2006), Djankov et al. (2006), Persson (2008), Lee and Park 
(2007), Nordås et al. (2006) and Iwanow and Kirkpatrick (2007) all tend to find significant 
effects on trade volumes. However, so far, there is only a very limited amount of research that 
deals with the effects of trade facilitation on trade decomposed into extensive and intensive 
margins or for different types of goods.  
Dennis and Shepherd (2007) use the number of 8-digit product lines for every two-
digit sector exported from developing countries to the EU in 2005 as a measure of export 
diversification – this being seen as export growth at the extensive margin. Using data from the 
World Bank’s Doing Business Database, they find that export costs, defined as the official 
fees levied on a 20-foot container leaving the exporting country, have a significantly negative 
effect on the number of product lines exported in every 2-digit sector.    6 
Sadikov (2007) makes use of the Doing Business Database  to  measure  trade 
facilitation-related border barriers as the number of signatures that an exporter has to collect 
from the authorities to export a good. Bilateral export volumes are then regressed on this as 
well as other gravity controls, while allowing homogeneous and differentiated goods to have 
different effects. Sadikov draws the conclusion that export volumes of differentiated products 
are more sensitive to changes in export signatures than exports volumes of homogeneous 
goods.  
Martínez-Zarzoso and Márquez-Ramos (2008) study the effect of trade facilitation on 
sectoral non-zero trade volumes in 2000. Including variables from the Doing Business 
Database, which measure the costs and time involved in exporting and importing, they 
conclude that export volumes of homogeneous  and reference-priced goods are less time-
sensitive than export volumes of differentiated goods. 
3.3  Data and Sample 
To measure the costs relevant for trade facilitation, we use the number of days needed to 
export a standardized good as a proxy. The data comes from the World Bank’s (2007a) Doing 
Business Database. In the Trading Across Borders section of this large survey, local freight 
forwarders, shipping lines, customs brokers and port officials are asked about how much time, 
documentation and costs would be involved for a hypothetical trading firm to export a well-
defined, standardized good.
3
Using eligibility for the 2005 EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) as the 
definition of being a developing country, we have access to data for 130 developing countries 




  Table 1 shows  some descriptive statistics  for 
developing countries. The average time needed to export a good for all developing countries 
is 34 days, but it actually varies from as low as 9 days in Panama up to a maximum of 102 
days in Iraq. For a list of the included countries, as well as data sources and definitions for the 
other variables, see Tables 5 and 6 in the Appendix.  
                                                      
3  The hypothetical trading firm that is a private limited liability company, fully domestically owned with a 
minimum of 100 employees, is located in the country’s most populous city but does not operate within an export 
processing zone (EPZ) or an industrial estate with special export or import privileges, and exports more than 10 per 
cent of its sales to international markets. The good is assumed to be non-hazardous, not to include any military 
arms or equipment, not to require refrigeration or any special environment, nor any special phytosanitary or 
environmental safety standards, and to be shipped in a dry-cargo, 20-foot, full container load. Trade is assumed to 
take place by ocean transportation through the closest or main port to the most populous city (the port may be 
located in another city or country). All procedures from the conclusion of a sales contract until the good leaves the 
port of exit are included. The database contains data on all documents required for export; the number of days 
needed, and the official fees levied on the container. For more specifics, see World Bank (2007a), or Djankov et al. 
(2006). 
4 For a few countries, there is no data for 2005, but data is available for 2006 or 2007. When this is the case, we 
choose to use the latter data to get as full a sample as possible. This is reasonable, given that there is very little 
time-series variation in the data (which implies, also, that nothing is gained from adding more years to the sample).    7 
Table 1. Days Needed for Exports by Developing Countries 
Country Group  Mean  Min  Max  No. of Obs. 
Low Income  43  20  82  51 
Lower Middle Income  31  15  102  50 
Upper Middle/High Income  21  9  36  29 
Least Developed  40  20  78  47 
All Developing Countries  34  9  102  130 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the World Bank (2007a) Doing Business Database. Note that these figures only 
include developing country exporters (a few of which will be classified as “high income”). 
 
The Doing Business Database has been extensively used in the trade facilitation literature – 
for instance by Dennis and Shepherd (2007) (the costs of exporting), Sadikov (2007) (number 
of signatures) and Martínez-Zarzoso and Márquez-Ramos (2008) (costs and time of exporting 
and importing). Popular as it may be, it should be acknowledged that the data is by no means 
ideal. The arguably most important problem is that there is (in practice) no real time series 
variation, implying that the researcher must instead rely on the cross-sectional variation 
between countries. Econometrically, this makes controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
much more difficult, and, obviously, it also makes it a lot harder to draw conclusions on 
causality rather than correlation. Further, the data does not differentiate between products, 
between different destination or origin countries or between large and small firms. These 
issues all pose problems for the empirical analysis, but it should be emphasized that no other 
available data is better on these accounts, and also tend to have poorer geographical coverage. 
We therefore choose to use this data as an indicator of the fixed and variable costs associated 
with exporting, while acknowledging that repeating the analysis with improved data in the 
future will be useful.  
It should lastly be noted that, while using the other Doing Business variables for a 
robustness check, we consider the time variable to be the best way to capture trade transaction 
costs.  The existence of sizeable direct costs for exporting or the need to collect many 
signatures or fill out many documents is primarily related to the fixed costs of exporting. 
Long time delays, on the other hand, can be caused by for example the need to collect many 
signatures, and will therefore capture fixed costs, but delays will, as discussed above, also 
capture variable costs of exporting. Therefore, the time variable is a much broader indicator, 
and should be a good proxy for the general effectiveness of cross-border trade procedures, 
which is what we want to capture.  
4  Empirical Analysis  
The extensive margin has received an increasing amount of attention in empirical research 
over the last the few years. Various methodologies and types of underlying trade data have   8 
been used to measure and draw conclusions about the extensive margin, but interestingly, 
irrespective of what kind of dependent variable is being used, most papers employ a set of 
explanatory variables that by and large can be said to belong to the gravity tradition.
5
This paper follows, among others, Dennis and Shepherd (2007) and measures the 
extensive margin by counting the number of products that a country exports. This measure is 
simple and intuitive, and it corresponds fairly well with the theoretical concepts. It would 
clearly be an advantage to use variations over time, or product-specific firm-level data. 
However, there is in practice no such data available on the effectiveness of cross-border trade 
procedures. Hence, to be able to say something about how these procedures affect the 
extensive margins of trade, it is necessary to exploit the cross-sectional variation between 
countries. 
 
As the basis for counting the number of exported products, we use data from Eurostat 
(2007) for 2005 on imports to EU25 countries at the 8-digit Combined Nomenclature (CN) 
level from all developing countries with positive exports to at least one EU country. Using 
these detailed import data to 25 EU countries from 152 developing countries gives us 3,800 
country-pairs and almost half a million observations with positive trade flows (in practice, the 
sample of exporters decreases to 130 countries due to lack of data on export transaction 
costs). Since we want to be able to test the hypothesis that different types of goods are not 
affected in the same way by trade transaction costs, we count the number of exported products 
for both of two types: differentiated and homogeneous, where the classification of goods into 
different types follows Rauch (1999).
6
It is important to be clear on how zeroes are to be treated. Eurostat only reports 
positive trade flows, but, using this to deduce the potential trade flows that are zero, it turns 
out that about 44 per cent of all (zero and non-zero) observations are such that there are no 
exports at all from the developing country for this particular type of product. Obviously, these 
  Thus, there are two observations on the extensive 
margin for every country-pair, yielding 7600 country-pair-type observations in total.  
                                                      
5  Examples of papers that have used disaggregated country-level trade data to measure the extensive (and 
sometimes intensive) margin include Dennis and Shepherd (2007), Cadot et al. (2007), Brenton and Newfarmer 
(2007), Evenett and Venables (2002), Flam and Nordström (2006), Baldwin and Di Nino (2006), Amurgo-Pacheco 
and Piérola (2008), Debaere and Mostashari (2005), Baldwin and Harrigan (2007), Hummels and Klenow (2005), 
Funke and Ruhwedel (2001) and Kehoe and Ruhl (2003). Other authors have used aggregated country-level trade 
data – Felbermayr and Kohler (2006; 2007) and Helpman et al. (2008) – or firm-level trade data: e.g. Bernard and 
Jensen (2004), Crozet and Koenig (2007), Bernard et al. (2007) and Andersson (2007). 
6 Rauch’s classification has been used in many contexts before. In the particular area of trade facilitation, Sadikov 
(2007) applies the so-called liberal classification, while Martínez-Zarzoso and Márquez-Ramos (2008) use the 
conservative categorization. For details on the classification, see Table 5 in the Appendix. Note that we use the 
conservative classification, but results do not change if we switch to the liberal classification. Note further that 
besides differentiated goods, Rauch distinguishes between two types of homogeneous goods – those that are traded 
on organized exchanges, and those for which there are reference prices that are quoted in trade publications. Since 
there does not seem to be a theoretical reason for treating these types of goods differently in the context of the 
Chaney (2008) model, we refer to both types of goods as homogeneous.    9 
zeroes are very important to include in the investigation, since trade might be absent precisely 
because trade costs are too high. 
4.1  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 suggests some interesting patterns regarding developing countries’ trade with the EU. 
Trade data at the 8-digit product level is very detailed, and still the mean number of products 
exported in any given bilateral pair is surprisingly low for all income groups: the highest 
number is 259 products on average for lower middle-income countries. However, looking at 
the maximum number of products that are exported bilaterally, there is also evidently a great 
deal of variation. For instance, China exports 5449 products to the United Kingdom, but, at 
the same time, there is actually no bilateral trade at all for quite a few pairs of countries. 
 
Table 2. Developing Countries’ Exports to the EU 
  No. of Products  Unique Products  No. of EU Markets 
Country Group  Mean  Max  Mean  Min  Max  Mean  Min  Max 
Low Income  106  3962  506  25  6038  19  9  25 
Lower Middle Income  259  5449  1194  12  7512  21  5  25 
Upper Middle/High Income  165  2476  917  7  5407  19  2  25 
Least Developed  30  589  225  25  1186  17  6  25 
All Developing Countries  181  5449  871  7  7512  20  2  25 
Note:  Author’s calculations using data from Eurostat (2007). Note that only developing countries’ exports to the EU are 
included: due to the definition of a developing country (GSP eligible), this will include some high income countries. The first two 
columns show the number of 8-digit products that are exported per bilateral pair. Unique products refers to the number of 
products that a developing country exports to any EU country. The last three columns show the number of EU markets the 
country exports to. 
 
Looking at unique products as well, i.e. the number of individual products that countries 
export to at least one EU country, the averages are a lot higher than the bilateral measures for 
all income groups. The average for all developing countries is 871 products, to be compared 
with 181 for any given bilateral pair. This suggests that while many countries have some 
exports to most EU countries (the average developing country exports to 20 EU markets), 
most of this trade takes place with only a few main trading partners, while the number of 
products exported to the rest is much lower. 
As shown in Table 3, for all country groups, the majority of all exports is in 
differentiated goods. However, while homogeneous goods represent only about 22 per cent of 
all goods that are exported, this trade corresponds to about 44 per cent of the value of exports: 
in other words, the bilateral flows of homogeneous goods tend to represent relatively large 
values. 
   10 
Table 3. Developing Countries’ Exports by Type of Product 
  Homogeneous Products  Differentiated Products 
Country Group  Average EM  Share Value  Share EM  Average EM  Share Value  Share EM 
Low Income  20  0.47  0.26  80  0.53  0.74 
Lower Middle Income  47  0.47  0.22  200  0.53  0.78 
Upper Middle/High Income  34  0.38  0.17  118  0.62  0.83 
Least Developed  6  0.43  0.24  23  0.57  0.76 
All Developing Countries  35  0.44  0.22  135  0.56  0.78 
Note: Author’s calculations using data on EU import flows from Eurostat (2007). For the types of products respectively, and for 
various country groups, figures show the average number of products (extensive margin: EM) being exported bilaterally, as well 
as the shares of the bilateral import value and numbers of products that can be attributed to the various types of goods. Note that 
only non-zero trade is used for these calculations. 
 
4.2  Estimation 
The extensive margin is empirically measured by counting the number of exported products 
for every type, i.e. the dependent variable takes the form of non-negative count data. Thus, 
using a linear model for  ( ) E| EM x  would be inappropriate, since this could yield negative 
predicted values. Instead, a Poisson estimation strategy is used (see Wooldridge 2002).
7
 
 It is 
assumed that 
(1)  ( ) ( ) E | exp xx β EM = . 
 
where x is a 1 K × vector of explanatory variables to be described below, and the vector β is 
1 K × . 
The choice of explanatory variables to include in xβ resembles that made in the rest 
of the literature on the extensive margin.  
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For future reference, we will refer to this as Model I. The vector of variables explaining the 
extensive margin of exports to importing EU country i from the exporting developing country 
j of product type s includes first and foremost the level of export transaction costs related to 
the efficiency of the cross-border trade procedures in the exporting country. This is labelled 
TFj. We use the number of days needed to export a good across the border as a proxy for 
                                                      
7 Estimated using STATA’s poisson command, with robust standard errors, clustered by country-pairs.    11 
export transaction costs. Besides these costs related to cross-border  trade  procedures, the 
distance  dij  between the two countries’  capitals is included as a proxy for  variable 
transportation costs. Further, we include indicator variables for sharing a common border, 
borderij, the same language, langij, or a joint colonial history, colonyij. These are variables that 
influence the ease with which new trading relationships can be created, so with reference to 
the theoretical model they primarily affect the level of fixed costs.  We  also control for 
whether the exporter is landlocked (landlj), a geographical  factor known to increase 
transportation costs. The model includes the exporting country’s GDP (Yj) and population (Pj) 
to control for supply capacity.
8
The model includes a dummy variable, diffs, equal to one if the observation refers to 
the number of differentiated goods, and zero otherwise. Since the dependent variable is the 
number of exported homogeneous and differentiated products, this is important because there 
are many more differentiated than homogeneous products. Lastly, because the paper focuses 
on export activities, we have chosen not to include importer characteristics such as the level 
of trade transaction costs in the importing country. Instead, the model includes importer fixed 
effects, 
 As a further control for the level of development and supply 
side conditions, there is a dummy (LDCj)  controlling for whether the exporter is a least 
developed country, and we control for the  average tariff country j  exporters face when 
exporting to country i,  tariffij, and for the exporting country’s level of remoteness (remoteij).  
i µ , which control for all observable and unobserved importer specific heterogeneity 
(including trade transaction costs, GDP etc).
9
The model above can be used to measure the average effect of trade transaction costs. 
However, the main innovation of the paper is to measure these effects separately for 
homogeneous and differentiated goods, so the model has to be augmented somewhat to be 
able to do this. Defining the vector z to consist of all explanatory variables except the ones 
measuring the trade transaction costs, Model II is given by 
 
 
(3)  ( ) ( ) 12 *ln *ln xβ zα ijs s ij s ij diff TF homo TF δδ = ++ . 
 
So, the variable measuring export transaction costs is now interacted with dummies for 
differentiated (diff) or homogeneous (homo) goods, allowing these two types of goods to have 
separate parameters. 
                                                      
8 Empirically, Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) have illustrated that diversification follows a U-shaped pattern, where 
countries first diversify when income per capita levels rise, but then start to specialize again at a later stage in the 
development process. Cadot et al. (2007) find the same pattern concerning export diversification. Concerning this, 
note that the inclusion of GDP and population means that we are de facto controlling for income per capita. 
9 Including country-specific exporter effects is appealing, but they would capture everything that only varies by 
exporter, i.e. one could not measure the effect of cumbersome cross-border trade procedures separately. See Table 
5 in the Appendix for all variable definitions and data sources.   12 
4.3  Empirical Results 
The results of a Poisson estimation of Models I and II are presented in the first two columns 
of  Table 7 in the Appendix.  In Model I, all the observations are pooled together. The 
estimation shows that, all else equal, countries with high export transaction costs, i.e. 
countries with long border delays, will export significantly fewer products. The coefficient 
can be interpreted as an elasticity, so decreasing border delays by 1 per cent will increase the 
number of exported products by about 0.61 per cent. This corresponds fairly well with the 
findings in Dennis and Shepherd (2007). These authors, while using a slightly different setup 
– for instance they use a different measure for trade transaction costs: the official costs of 
exporting
10
In Model II, the specification has been made less restrictive by allowing 
homogeneous and differentiated goods to have different coefficients. This leads to some 
interesting results. First, as expected, differentiated and homogeneous goods both have 
negative and highly significant coefficients for trade transaction costs. In other words, all else 
equal, countries with inefficient border procedures tend to export fewer differentiated and 
homogeneous goods. Second, the coefficient for differentiated products is significantly more 
negative than the corresponding coefficient for homogeneous goods. This suggests that, just 
as predicted by the theoretical model, differentiated goods are more sensitive to these kinds of 
barriers, and countries with long border delays will particularly tend to export fewer 
differentiated products. Thus, although one must be careful not to draw too strong causal 
conclusions given that there is only cross-sectional evidence at hand, the results are certainly 
consistent with the theoretical predictions in Chaney (2008). 
 – find an elasticity of -0.32.  
It may also be interesting to say a few words about the other explanatory variables. 
Distance, proxying for variable transport costs, has the expected negative and significant 
coefficient. Sharing a border, or having a joint colonial history both have a significantly 
positive effect on the extensive margin. This is as expected, since these are factors that 
influence the ease with which new trading relationships are created. More surprisingly, 
however, there is no evidence that two countries sharing the same language will trade a larger 
number of products: the coefficient is insignificant. The coefficient for landlockedness is 
significant and negative, while the coefficients for GDP and population are significant and 
positive. The dummy controlling for whether the exporter is an LDC or not also has a 
significant and negative coefficient. Lastly, the EU tariff level has a positive and significant 
coefficient, which is not what one would expect, and the variable measuring remoteness is 
insignificant.  
                                                      
10 They also use a different sample (for instance they use aggregate EU imports) and calculate the number of 
exported products per 2-digit sector.   13 
4.4  Policy Simulations  
From a policy perspective, the issue of the relationship between inefficient border procedures 
and the extensive margin boils down to the question: “How many more products would a 
country export if it were to engage in trade facilitation reform?”. Given the sort of data that is 
available at present – cross-sectional data that only rather crudely proxies the efficiency of 
cross-border trade procedures, and that prevents the use of estimation methods where one 
could more properly control for unobserved heterogeneity across exporting countries – one 
should be very cautious when interpreting the estimation results as causal relationships. 
Therefore, using the estimated parameters to simulate what the effects would be of reducing 
border delays can at best only be seen as an illustrative exercise. However, it does offer an 
intuitive understanding of what the data and estimation results might actually be telling us, so 
remembering that the figures should not be taken too literally, we have considered two reform 
scenarios.  
 
Table 4. Policy Simulations: Trade Facilitation’s Effects on Exports  
    Scenario 1  Scenario 2 
    5-day reduction  Best practice within income group  













Relations   
Differentiated goods  Low Income  10  12  284  65  57  1283 
  Lower Middle Income  16  54  1330  57  94  2242 
  Upper Middle/High Income  25  57  1394  74  205  4986 
  Least Developed   11  5  91  63  28  564 
  All Developing Countries  15  38  934  64  104  2478 
Homogeneous goods  Low Income  5  2  32  30  6  135 
  Lower Middle Income  8  7  161  26  11  249 
  Upper Middle/High Income  13  6  143  33  23  551 
  Least Developed   6  1  8  29  3  39 
  All Developing Countries  8  5  106  29  12  269 
Note: Scenario 1 represents a uniform reduction of border delays by five days for all countries. Scenario 2 represents reform such 
that all countries reach the same level of border delays as the country within the income group that has the lowest level of delays, 
i.e. the country with best practice. Per cent is the percentage change in the number of products exported bilaterally. Products is 
the change in the number of products exported bilaterally. Exp.Relation (export relationships) multiplies the average change in 
the number of exported products by the number of markets that the exporter serves. 
 
In the first scenario, there is a uniform reduction of border delays by five days for all 
countries. For most countries, this corresponds to a fairly realistic reform. As shown in Table 
4, all else equal, this can be expected to increase the number of exported differentiated 
products by an average of 15 per cent, with income group averages ranging from 10 to 25 per 
cent. The number of exported homogeneous products would increase by 5 to 13 per cent. 
Translated into actual products, this means that a typical developing country would export an 
extra 38 differentiated or 5 homogeneous products in any given bilateral trade relationship.   14 
Since most developing countries export to many EU countries, as illustrated in the column 
Exp.Relation, if this number is multiplied by the number of EU markets that an export country 
serves, this scenario would on average lead to an additional 934 export relationships in 
differentiated goods for every exporter, or 106 new export relationships in homogeneous 
goods (where an export relationship is defined as one product that is exported to one market). 
Note that these are actually conservative estimates of the number of new export relationships, 
since trade facilitation may also make it possible for countries to export to new markets. 
In Scenario 2, through trade facilitation, all countries reach the same level of border 
delays as the country with the lowest level of delays within their own income group. Of 
course, unlike Scenario 1, this is not a realistic outcome. However, since it takes as its point 
of reference the level of border delays that the most ambitious countries at various income 
levels have actually achieved, it offers a sort of “best case” scenario, and illustrates what 
could reasonably be gained if countries made trade facilitation their priority. The changes 
needed in an individual country will depend on its initial level of delays, so those that 
currently have the largest problems will be expected to change the most, while the countries 
with best practice are assumed to temporarily have exhausted their reform possibilities. 
In this “best case” scenario, the number of exported differentiated products would on 
average increase by 64 per cent, while the number of homogeneous products would increase 
by 29 per cent. In other words, if all countries were as efficient at the border as the most 
efficient country  at the same level of development, every bilateral North-South trade 
relationship would be diversified by an extra 104 differentiated and 12 homogeneous 
products. Taking multiple export markets into account, the average developing country would 
have almost 2500 extra differentiated export relationships, with roughly twice that figure for 
upper middle- and high-income developing countries. The corresponding figure regarding 
homogeneous products would be 269 new export relationships.  
4.5  Robustness  
The results have been submitted to a number of robustness checks. As shown in Table 7 in the 
Appendix, we estimate the model using alternative estimation methods. The most common 
alternative to the Poisson model is the Negative Binomial model, which is less restrictive, 
since it does not assume that the mean equals the variance. We also employ zero-inflated 
Poisson and zero-inflated Negative Binomial models, where non-zero and zero outcomes have 
different probability models (see  Greene 2008). Further, long border delays could be the 
result of large trade flows, which in turn could result indirectly from many exported products. 
To investigate whether such endogeneity influences the results, we estimate the model using a 
Poisson GMM estimator which allows endogenous variables to be instrumented by excluded   15 
variables – see Mullahy (1997) and Nichols (2007). The official costs of exporting and the 
number of documents required, both variables originating from the Doing Business Database, 
are used as instruments for trade transaction costs.  Moreover, since it is not possible to 
explicitly control for unobserved exporter heterogeneity by fixed effects in the baseline 
specification, as an alternative, we  try estimating a Poisson model  with  exporter random 
effects. We also, lastly, estimate the model with a simple OLS regression. Reassuringly, in all 
cases, but one, the conclusions remain the same. The only exception is that while both 
differentiated and homogeneous products consistently  have negative coefficients  (and the 
former coefficient always is larger in absolute terms), in the Poisson estimation with exporter 
random effects, the coefficient is only significant for differentiated goods. 
Having established that the results are generally robust to several other estimation 
methods, we also check whether different samples or the inclusion of additional covariates 
makes a difference. Estimation results are displayed in Table 8. First, to see whether bilateral 
trade relationships that involve very few or no products influence the results, we exclude in 
three steps all observations where the number of exported products is zero or less than ten or 
less than 50. Second, we add an index over how well corruption is perceived to be controlled 
(a factor clearly related to the subject of efficient cross-border trade procedures); a control for 
the cost of entering the domestic market (following Dennis and Shepherd 2007); and the share 
of agriculture in GDP or the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) for the agricultural or 
mining industries as controls for comparative advantage. The coefficients for both types of 
goods are remarkably stable, and always significantly negative.  
Lastly, we allow different coefficients for low- and middle/high-income exporters. 
Interestingly, as can be seen in Table 8, we again find the negative coefficients of a similar 
magnitude for both types of goods, but the low-income exporters seem to experience even 
larger negative effects than middle/high income developing countries. So, to summarize, the 
result are robust to several alternative estimation methods, different samples of trade and 
exporting countries and the inclusion of additional control variables.  
5  Summary and Conclusions 
Focusing on the potential of trade facilitation for North-South trade, this paper investigates 
whether the extensive margins of trade in differentiated and homogeneous goods are affected 
in the same way by trade transaction costs related to cumbersome cross-border trade 
procedures. This is done by counting the number of 8-digit products that are exported from 
developing to EU countries, and then using this number as the dependent variable in an 
estimation, allowing separate effects for differentiated and homogeneous goods. Trade 
transaction costs are proxied by the number of days needed to export a good, using data from   16 
the World Bank Doing Business Database. The theoretical model in Chaney (2008) is used to 
derive the hypothesis that while the extensive margin for both differentiated and 
homogeneous  goods will be negatively affected by cumbersome cross-border trade 
procedures, the negative effect should be stronger for differentiated goods. 
Our empirical findings suggest that countries with large export transaction costs, all 
else equal, will tend to export fewer goods. The results further indicate that both the number 
of exported differentiated and the number of exported homogeneous goods are significantly 
negatively affected by inefficient cross-border trade procedures, but also that the negative 
effect is stronger for differentiated goods. Estimation results suggest that if export transaction 
costs declined by 1 per cent, the number of exported differentiated goods would rise by 0.7 
per cent, and the number of homogeneous goods would increase by 0.4 per cent. Hence, while 
the lack of time-series variation prevents us from drawing any strong causal conclusions, the 
results are certainly consistent with the theoretical predictions.  
Policy simulations further illustrate that if all developing countries engaged in trade 
facilitation so that a uniform reduction of border delays by five days was reached, the average 
developing country would export an extra 15 per cent differentiated products and 8 per cent 
homogeneous products to any given EU importer. This  might be viewed as a realistic 
outcome. Given a more ambitious – “best-case” – reform scenario, leaving all countries as 
efficient at the border as the most efficient country at the same level of development, the 
number of exported differentiated and homogeneous products would on average increase by 
64 and 29 per cent respectively.  
Hence, while again emphasizing the caution against drawing too strong conclusions 
from purely cross-sectional evidence, results do indicate that even a “realistic” reform 
scenario would have positive effects on the extensive margin, implying that developing 
countries’ exports would become more diversified. In a “best case” scenario, which is realistic 
in the sense that it builds on what countries at different levels of development have actually 
achieved today, but still quite ambitious, reforming countries would achieve a much more 
diversified export structure. 
To conclude, we find evidence that trade facilitation has effects on the extensive 
margin of trade, and therefore affects the range of goods that can be traded. We also find, 
however, that this effect is not uniform across products: differentiated products are more 
sensitive than homogeneous products to this type of trade barrier and would therefore respond 
more strongly to reform aimed at achieving more efficient trade procedures. Interestingly, not 
only is the elasticity itself stronger for differentiated goods, but as illustrated by the policy 
simulations, translated into actual traded products, the results are much larger for 
differentiated goods.   17 
Hence, a policy oriented interpretation of our results could be that countries with 
inefficient and bureaucratic border procedures will run the risk of having no choice but to 
export a small range of products, most of them homogeneous. On the other hand, as 
highlighted in the policy simulations, countries engaging in reform could expect not only to 
get a more diversified export by increasing the total number of exported products, but also to 
have their export consist of differentiated goods to a larger extent, since these are the products 
that respond strongly to reform. In other words, the earlier discussion of the benefits of trade 
facilitation, focusing on the magnitude of trade volume increases, may have missed some 
additional – potentially important – benefits. Exports may not only grow, but also become 
more diversified, which, it is often argued, has its own benefits for developing countries. 
Also, trade facilitation would remove at least one of the obstacles to exporting the sort of 
differentiated products that many developing countries lack in their exports today. 
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Appendix 
Table 5. Variables and Data Sources 
Imports   8-digit (Combined Nomenclature) imports from the Eurostat (2007) Comext Database. Until the 6-
digit level, the CN classification is the same as the Harmonized System (HS) classification. Since the 
CN chapter 99 is not included in the HS classification, we have removed this chapter (this means 
disregarding 760 observations out of nearly half a million). Keeping only the goods that are classified 
by Rauch (1999) implies that an additional 35,430 observations are deleted. 
Export Transaction 
Cost (TF)  
Time needed to export a good across the border. Data from the World Bank (2007a) Doing Business 
Database. 
Distance   Distance in kilometres between capital cities from CEPII (2006). 
Border  Importer and exporter share a common border. From CEPII (2006). 
Common Language  CEPII (2006). 
Colony  Importer and exporter have been in a colonial relationship. From CEPII (2006). 
Landlocked  CEPII (2006). 
GDP   World Bank (2007b) World Development Indicators (WDI). 
Population  World Bank (2007b) World Development Indicators (WDI). 
LDC  Country is a least developed country. 
Tariff  Average applied tariff, calculated using data at the HS2 level from the MAcMap Database, CEPII 
(2007). See also Bouët et al. (2004).  
Rauch Classification  Dummy variables indicating whether the good is classified as homogeneous or differentiated by 
Rauch (1999). Data on the Rauch Classification (revised July 2007), at the 4-digit (SITC Rev. 2) 
level from “John Haveman’s International Trade Data” at 
http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/trade.resources/tradedata.html. 
Concordances between SITC Rev.2 and Rev. 3 from Feenstra (1996). Concordances between SITC 
Rev. 3 and HS from the United Nations Statistics Division (2008).  
Export Documents  Alternative measure of export transaction costs: The number of all documents needed to export a 
good across the border. Data from the World Bank (2007a) Doing Business Database. 
Export Costs  Alternative measure of export transaction costs: The costs associated with all the procedures required 
to export a good across the border. Data from the World Bank (2007a) Doing Business Database. 
Control of Corruption  Data from the Transparency International (2006) Corruption Perceptions Index. 
Domestic Market 
Entry Cost 
The official cost of registering a firm in per cent of per capita income. Data from the World Bank 
(2007a) Doing Business Database. 
Share of Agriculture 
in GDP 
World Bank (2007b) World Development Indicators (WDI).  
RCA   Revealed Comparative Advantage calculated as RCA = (X-M) / (X+M), where X is exports in a given 
industry, and M is imports. RCA is calculated for agriculture (HS chapters 1-24) and minerals (HS 
chapters 25-43), using aggregate EU trade with the developing country. 
Remoteness 
















 ∑ , 
where N contains all countries in the world, and σ = 4. 
Note: All data are for 2005 unless otherwise stated. 
Table 6. Sample of Exporters 
Exporting Region  Country 
West Africa  Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, 
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo 
Central Africa  Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Dem. Rep., Congo Rep., Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, São Tomé and Principe 
Eastern and Southern 
Africa 
Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, 
Seychelles, Sudan, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Southern Africa  Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania 
Caribbean  Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, 
St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago 
Pacific  Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tonga, Vanuatu 
South Asia  Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka  
East and South-East Asia  Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China,  Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia,  Philippines, 
Thailand, Timor-Leste, Vietnam 
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russian 
Federation, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
Middle East  Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen 
Mediterranean  Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia 
Latin America  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela 
Note: All countries eligible (in 2005) for the EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme, and for which there is data on 
export border procedures, are included as developing country exporters. All EU25 countries are included as importers.    21 
Table 7. Estimation Results  
  Poisson  Poisson  Negative  Zero-  Zero-  GMM  Random  OLS 
      Binomial  Inflated  Inflated  Poisson  Effects   
        Poisson  Neg. Bin.    Poisson   
TF  -0.611***               
                 
TF Differentiated    -0.664***  -0.664***  -0.678***  -0.592***  -1.072***  -0.653**  -0.676*** 
    [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.035]  [0.000] 
TF Homogeneous    -0.357***  -0.436***  -0.349***  -0.411***  -0.638***  -0.302  -0.182*** 
    [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.314]  [0.005] 
Distance  -0.278***  -0.278***  -0.619***  -0.266***  -0.546***  -0.764***  -1.109***  -0.375*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Common Border  1.093***  1.093***  1.391***  1.046***  1.294***  1.243***  0.878***  1.967*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Shared Language  0.131  0.13  0.366***  0.127  0.420***  0.309**  0.456***  0.418*** 
  [0.361]  [0.362]  [0.001]  [0.309]  [0.000]  [0.019]  [0.001]  [0.000] 
Colonial History  0.589***  0.589***  0.789***  0.580***  0.680***  0.893***  0.381***  0.575*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Landlocked  -0.403***  -0.406***  -0.024  -0.372***  -0.079  0.287***  0.093  -0.269*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.757]  [0.000]  [0.305]  [0.003]  [0.734]  [0.000] 
GDP  0.293***  0.292***  0.479***  0.277***  0.451***  0.490***  0.575***  0.379*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Population  0.410***  0.410***  0.357***  0.410***  0.334***  0.415***  0.249**  0.326*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.010]  [0.000] 
LDC  -0.696***  -0.696***  -0.719***  -0.591***  -0.496***  -0.868***  -0.586***  -0.573*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.007]  [0.000] 
EU Tariff  5.693***  5.693***  2.782**  6.344***  5.373***  0.327  -3.394**  5.226*** 
  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.017]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.786]  [0.044]  [0.000] 
Remoteness  0.763  0.767  0.955***  0.743  1.108***  0.810**  2.966**  1.989*** 
  [0.222]  [0.220]  [0.007]  [0.172]  [0.000]  [0.035]  [0.011]  [0.000] 
Constant  -6.658***  -7.464***  -8.039***  -7.192***  -7.886***  -7.159***  -4.438***  -8.449*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.005]  [0.000] 
No. of Observations  6250  6250  6250  6250  6250  6250  6250  4380 
Importer Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Type Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Note: The dependent variable is the number of exported 8-digit products per type of product, except in the OLS estimations 
where the natural log of this variable is used. Robust p-values in brackets (standard errors have been clustered by country-pair). 
Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels. Table 8. Robustness: Sample and Covariates 
  Products>0  Products>10  Products>50  Corruption  Market Entry  Agriculture  RCA_Agr  RCA_Min  Income Class. 
TF Differentiated  -0.680***  -0.684***  -0.657***  -0.639***  -0.621***  -0.669***  -0.611***  -0.504***   
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]   
Low Income                  -0.659*** 
                  [0.000] 
Middle/High Income                -0.600*** 
                  [0.000] 
TF Homogeneous  -0.347***  -0.369***  -0.465***  -0.326***  -0.311***  -0.332***  -0.294***  -0.197**   
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.016]   
Low Income                  -0.279*** 
                  [0.000] 
Middle/High Income                -0.161* 
                  [0.053] 
Distance  -0.265***  -0.239***  -0.207***  -0.294***  -0.226***  -0.293***  -0.446***  -0.387***  -0.265*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Common Border  1.047***  0.912***  0.698***  1.450***  1.012***  0.980***  1.046***  1.017***  1.036*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.002]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Shared Language  0.127  0.083  0.021  0.129  0.143  0.118  0.082  0.074  0.172 
  [0.362]  [0.532]  [0.874]  [0.331]  [0.304]  [0.404]  [0.563]  [0.601]  [0.225] 
Colonial History  0.579***  0.563***  0.533***  0.550***  0.617***  0.592***  0.606***  0.611***  0.589*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Landlocked  -0.370***  -0.213**  0.036  -0.406***  -0.512***  -0.419***  -0.378***  -0.403***  -0.438*** 
  [0.000]  [0.015]  [0.766]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
GDP  0.276***  0.235***  0.185***  0.108***  0.225***  0.379***  0.384***  0.400***  0.244*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Population  0.410***  0.405***  0.382***  0.601***  0.458***  0.317***  0.313***  0.367***  0.461*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
LDC  -0.588***  -0.419***  -0.220**  -0.740***  -0.572***  -0.554***  -0.502***  -0.824***  -0.619*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.046]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
EU Tariff  6.340***  7.094***  7.360***  3.711**  5.755***  6.248***  4.994***  5.372***  5.874*** 
  [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.022]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.004]  [0.002]  [0.001] 
Remoteness  0.744  0.51  0.032  0.351  0.28  0.888  -0.202  1.051*  0.781  
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  [0.230]  [0.415]  [0.962]  [0.483]  [0.645]  [0.151]  [0.760]  [0.098]  [0.198] 
Control of Corruption      1.165***           
        [0.000]           
Market Entry Cost        -0.147***         
          [0.000]         
Share of Agriculture in GDP          0.042       
            [0.498]       
RCA_Agriculture              0.347***     
              [0.000]     
RCA_Minerals                -0.439***   
                [0.000]   
Constant  -7.188***  -6.093***  -4.115***  -7.332***  -6.704***  -8.232***  -6.773***  -8.973***  -7.803*** 
  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
No of Observations  4380  2313  1139  5050  6250  5150  6250  6250  6250 
Importer Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Type Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Note: Results from Poisson estimations of Model II. The dependent variable is the number of exported 8-digit products per type of product. Robust p-values in brackets (standard errors have been 
clustered by country-pair). Asterisks denote significance at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) levels.  